Indiana Law Journal
Volume 5

Issue 6

Article 9

3-1930

Foreign Corporations-Jurisdiction Resulting from Business Done
within State

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction
Commons

Recommended Citation
(1930) "Foreign Corporations-Jurisdiction Resulting from Business Done within State," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 5 : Iss. 6 , Article 9.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol5/iss6/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Concerning the ability of wife to consent for husband (not decided in
the principal case), cases holding squarely that wife cannot consent, Polowick v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 843; Veal v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 643;
Carigano v. Commonwealth, 238 Pac. 507 (Okla.). An agent was not allowed to consent for his principal in Tri-State Coal and Coke Co., 253 Fed.
605. But a mother can consent for her son in Kentucky, Gray v. Commonwealth, supra, and consent by wife was upheld in Smith v. MeDuffee, supra,
and State v. Luna, supra. Indiana will probably follow the Kentucky rule
J. S. G.
if the question is ever presented.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-JURISDICTION RESULTING FROm BUSINESS DONE

WITHIN STATE-Respondent purchased a through coupon ticket at the office
of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company in New Orleans, which entitled him to passage over the line of the Louisville & Nashville from New
Orleans to Montgomery, Ala., over the Atlanta & West Point R. R. from
Montgomery to Atlanta, Ga., and thence to Washington over the line of the
Southern Railway Co., petitioner. The train was made up by the Louisville
& Nashville in New Orleans and was operated under an agreement among
the three carriers concerned, which was not offered in evidence. But it
appeared that the cars composing the train were furnished by the three
carriers on the basis of their respective mileage; that each fu rnished locomotive power-and train crews over its own line; and that each, while in
possession of the train, was in exclusive control of it.
Respondent took passage in New Orleans on a car of the Southern and
proceeded in it on his journey until, while on the line of the Southern in
Virginia, he was injured, due to alleged negligence of petitioner.
The Southern was a Virginia corporation, which had complied with the
Louisiana statute by designating an agent to accept service of process within that state.
A tort action was brought by the respondent in the District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. Process against petitioner was accordingly served upon its agent in Louisiana. The Southern, appearing specially before answer, excepted to the jurisdiction on the ground that the
cause of action, which was transitory, arose outside of Louisiana and not
out of any business done within that state. The exception was overruled.
Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, October 15, 1928.
The Supreme Court (although reversing the decision of the District
Court upon other grounds) upheld its position in overruling the petitioner's
exception to its jurisdiction. The grounds for the Supreme Court's decision
were (1) Petitioner was sufficiently present within the state of Louisiana
for the purpose of being sued upon a cause of action arising within the state.
(9) This cause of action was one connected with a contract for transportation, as evidenced by the ticket sold to respondent in New Orleans, by petitioner's agent, the Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co. "It was out of this
action within the state that the present obligation of the Southern arose,
although the alleged breach of it occurred elsewhere." Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Chatters; Southern Ry. Co. et al. v. Same, 49 Supreme
Court Reporter, 329, April 15, 1929.
If the liability of a railway carrier of passengers for a negligent injury
to a passenger may be considered to be of a dual nature, i. e., a liability in
tort, and a liability for breach of the contract of carriage, then the position

RECENT CASE NOTES
which the Supreme Court took upon this point must have been a correct
one. There is substantial authority for this proposition, the cases seeming
to grant to the injured plaintiff an election between remedies for breach of
contract and for tort. On this point, in general, see: 15 Encyc. Pleading
and Practice, 1121; 5 R. C. L., Sec. 702.
A significant feature of the case is the fact that the Court apparently
concedes that a foreign corporation, legally "doing business" in a state, and
legally present there, is nevertheless amenable only to suit growing out of
business done within that jurisdiction. Had the action been on the contract
liability, then clearly it could be said to be one arising out of business done
in the State of Louisiana, for the contract was entered into in that state.
Quoting the opinion: "A foreign corporation is amenable to suit to enforce a personal liability if it is doing business within the jurisdiction in
such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is
present there. Even when present and amenable to suit it may not, unless
it has consented, be sued on transitory causes of action arising elsewhere
which are unconnected with any corporate action by it within the jurisdiction." (Italics ours.) The court then proceeds to bring the case within this
rule by holding that the cause of action was, in fact, one connected with
business done within the jurisdiction. It was plain that the corporation
itself was present within the state, doing business there. If the Supreme
Court had not believed that this in itself was insufficient, but that the cause
of action must have arisen from corporate action within the jurisdiction,
then it would have been unnecessary for it to go to the extent it did to show
that the business was done within the state.
That the case is perhaps an innovation in the law as to jurisdiction over
foreign corporations may be indicated by the following reference from the
American Law Institute restatement of the law of Conflict of Laws, published in 1926: "Special Note-It has not yet been settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States whether, when a corporation does intrastate
business in a state it subjects itself to the jurisdiction of the state as to
causes of action not arising out of the business done within the state, so
that the state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction over it by serving
an agent of the corporation." Am. Law. Inst. Restatement No. 2, p. 83.
The Restatement, however, adopts the rule requiring that the suit arise out
of such local transaction, and has furnished considerable authority in point.
The principal case states the rule a little more broadly, i. e., jurisdiction
extends to all causes of action connected with business done in the state, regardless of whether or not the cause of action arises out of the business
done, in the technical sense.
It is submitted that such a rule would tend to eliminate much of the
inconvenience and expense which now result from the practice of serving a
corporation in some states where the plaintiff believes he will be more fortunate at the hands of the courts and juries, and requiing parties and witnesses to attend the trial from points sometimes at a great distance from
the site of the tribunal so chosen.
C. W. W.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF PARTIES AND ACTION-This was an action of appellees for damages resulting from fire from appellant's engines. The first
paragraph was for the loss of a barn of the value of $600. The appellee
insurance company had insured the barn for $200, and now, after full pay-

